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Abstract
We provide a historical perspective focusing on Ziemba’s experiences and research
on the bond-stock earnings yield di↵erential model (BSEYD) starting from when he
first used it in Japan in 1988 through to the present in 2014. The model has called
many but not all crashes. Those called have high interest rates in long term bonds
relative to the trailing earnings to price ratio. In general, when the model is in the
danger zone, almost always there will be a crash. The model predicted the crashes
in China, Iceland and the US in the 2006-9 period. Iceland had a drop of fully 95%.
For the US the call was on June 14, 2007 and the stock market fell 56.8%. A longer
term study for the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, and UK shows that over long periods
being in the stock market when the bond-stock signal is not in the danger zone and in
cash when it is in the danger zone provides a final wealth about double buy and hold
for each of these five countries. The best use of the model is for predicting crashes.
Finally we compare Shiller’s high PE ratio crash model to the BSEYD model for the
US market from 1962-2012. While both models add value, the BSEYD model predicts
crashes better.
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1 Introduction
Since credit for the first publications on the BSEYD and its relationship to the later
discovered and widely discussed Fed model has eluded Ziemba, he would like to discuss his
early experiences with the model and the historical record of his involvement with it since
1988. The Fed model is a special case of the BSEYD model.1
2 A bond-stock return crash danger model2
In May 1988 I was invited by Yamaichi Securities to interview to be the first Yamaichi
visiting professor of finance at the University of Tsukuba, a Japanese national university.
Yamaichi wished to try to establish the study of finance, especially investments, in Japanese
universities, which was not generally taught. They established a five-year program with
five such visiting professors in succession. The teaching at the university (I taught invest-
ments, security market anomalies, futures and options) was supplemented with a two-day
a week consulting position in Tokyo some 60 kilometers southwest of Tsukuba at Yamaichi
Securities then the fourth largest securities firm in Japan and the sixth largest in the world.
In my interview I asked if I could study market imperfections (anomalies) and stock market
crashes in two study groups with some of the young Yamaichi Research Institute employees
who also came up to Tsukuba for my classes.
My proposal was accepted and each study group with about ten eager young students in
each group proceeded by me giving lectures on the US experience and they helping me
investigate the Japanese situation. We focused on the postwar period 1948 to 1988 and
much of what I learned appears in the book Invest Japan, Ziemba and Schwartz (1991) and
the 1989-1993 research papers of Ziemba and Schwartz and Stone and Ziemba (1993). My
wife Dr Sandra L. Schwartz and I also wrote the book Power Japan (1992) that discussed
the Japanese economy. Sandra had a pretty good idea right away that the Japanese policies
that let to astronomically high land and stock prices and massive trade surpluses would
lead to disaster and they would eventually lose most of the money that they received from
selling cars, stereos and the like. We made a list of prestige buildings that the Japanese
overpaid for in the 1987-89 era in Power Japan. Even at the height of their economic power
in 1989 only 3% of Japanese assets were invested abroad.
My study groups started in August 1988 and ended a year later. I was asked to remain as a
1This paper presents one crash prediction model that has worked well over time in the US, Japan and
elsewhere. Other crash prediction models are discussed by Sornette and Zhou (2002), Sornette (2009),
and Yan, Woodard and Sornette (2012ab). Jarrow, Kohia and Protter (2011) discuss when a bubble exists.
Shireyev, Zhitlukhin and Ziemba (2014ab) discuss stopping rule model to exit and enter bubble type markets.
2This section relates to Ziemba’s early experience with this model so it is written in his words.
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consultant for the fall of 1988 to complete a factor model discussed in Schwartz and Ziemba
(2000) which was originally presented at a Berkeley Program in Finance meeting in Santa
Barbara in September 1992. The factor model used anomaly ideas such as mean reversion,
earnings surprise, momentum, price-earnings ratios, future earnings over price, and value
embedded in 30 variables to separate and rank stocks by their future mean performance
from best to worst for all the stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange first section which was
about 86% of the total capitalization. The model motivated by a similar model for the
US by Jacobs and Levy (1988), was estimated yearly but updated monthly. The model
performed well out of sample so was useful for hedge fund long-short trading as well as
long only investing. The hedge fund Buchanan Partners in London discovered the model
which was discussed in Invest Japan when they bought the book and hired me to help
them in their Japanese warrant trading which was largely long underpriced warrants and
short overpriced stocks. Their trading was successful and the model, which was estimated
using data during a stock market rise still worked when the decline came since variables
such as earnings were the key drivers of the returns. An update of Japanese anomalies to
1994 appears in Comolli and Ziemba (2000).
In the crash study group I came up with a simple model in 1988 with only a single variable
that being the di↵erence between stock and bond rates of return.3 The idea was that
stocks and bonds compete for investment dollars and, when interest rates are low, stocks
are favored and when interest rates are high, bonds are favored. The main thing that I
wished to focus on is that when the measure, the di↵erence between these two rates, the
long bond yield minus the earnings yield (the reciprocal of the price earnings ratio), was
very large, then there was a high chance of a stock market crash. A crash was defined as a
10% fall in the index within one year. The model explains the October 1987 crash. That
application is how this idea came to me. Table 1 and Figure 1 show this. The boxes indicate
that there is extreme danger in the stock market because 30-year government bond yields
are very much higher than usual stock market yields measured by the reciprocal of the
previous year’s reported price earnings ratio. These high interest rates invariably lead to
a stock market crash. Here the danger indicator moved across a statistical 95% confidence
line in April. The market ignored this signal but did eventually crash in October 1987.
There was a similar signal ignored by most investors in the US S&P500 around April 1999
and then a crash that began in August 2000 and a weak stock market in 2001/02 which is
discussed below.
Returning to the story in Japan, in 1988-89, I asked one of my young colleagues in my
crash study group, Sugheri Iishi, to check the accuracy of the bond-stock prediction model
in Japan. We found that there were twenty 10% plus crashes during the out of sample
forty years, 1949-89. Whenever this measure was in the danger zone (that is outside a 95%
3Later we show that this di↵erence model is a generalization of the ratio model, known as the Fed model.
Koivu, Pennanen and Ziemba (2005) study this model which seems to date from Fed minutes in 1996. See
Yardeni (1997).
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Table 1: S&P500 index, PE ratios, government bond yields and the yield premium over
stocks, January 1984 to August 1988. Source: Ziemba and Schwartz (1991)
S&P (a) (b)
Index PER 30 Yr G bd 1/pe,% (a)-(b)
1986 Jan 208.19 14.63 9.32 6.84 2.48
Feb 219.37 15.67 8.28 6.38 1.90
Mar 232.33 16.50 7.59 6.06 1.53
Apr 237.98 16.27 7.58 6.15 1.43
May 238.46 17.03 7.76 5.87 1.89
Jun 245.30 17.32 7.27 5.77 1.50
Jul 240.18 16.31 7.42 6.13 1.29
Aug 245.00 17.47 7.26 5.72 1.54
Sep 238.27 15.98 7.64 6.26 1.38
Oct 237.36 16.85 7.61 5.93 1.68
Nov 245.09 16.99 7.40 5.89 1.51
Dec 248.60 16.72 7.33 5.98 1.35
1987 Jan 264.51 15.42 7.47 6.49 0.98
Feb 280.93 15.98 7.46 6.26 1.20
Mar 292.47 16.41 7.65 6.09 1.56
Apr 289.32 16.22 9.56 6.17 3.39
May 289.12 16.32 8.63 6.13 2.50
Jun 301.38 17.10 8.40 5.85 2.55
Jul 310.09 17.92 8.89 5.58 3.31
Aug 329.36 18.55 9.17 5.39 3.78
Sep 318.66 18.10 9.66 5.52 4.14
Oct 280.16 14.16 9.03 7.06 1.97
Nov 245.01 13.78 8.90 7.26 1.64
Dec 240.96 13.55 9.10 7.38 1.72
1988 Jan 250.48 12.81 8.40 7.81 0.59
Feb 258.10 13.02 8.33 7.68 0.65
Mar 265.74 13.42 8.74 7.45 1.29
Apr 262.61 13.24 9.10 7.55 1.55
May 256.20 12.92 9.24 7.74 1.50
Jun 270.68 13.65 8.85 7.33 1.52
Jul 269.44 13.59 9.18 7.36 1.82
Aug 263.73 13.30 9.30 7.52 1.78
confidence band), there was a crash of 10% or more from the current level within one year.
This was 12 out of 12, a splendid prediction record. Not all crashes had the measure in
the danger zone but whenever it was there was a crash with no misses. Some eight crashes
occurred for other reasons. Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2009) in their study of banking crises
study some such circumstances that lead to stock market crashes of both interest rate and
non-interest rate driven types. See also the classic book Kindleberger and Aliber (2011)
and our study of hedge fund and related disasters. Lleo and Ziemba (2014a) study hedge
funds and bank trading disasters, how they occur and how they could be prevented.
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Figure 1: Bond and stock yield di↵erential model for NSA, 1980-1990, Source: Ziemba and
Schwartz, 1991
Value of NSA for various spread values
Date/level Spread, % NSA
May 29, 1990 4.88 32,818
Mean 3.79 20,022
Upper limit 4.23 23,754
Lower limit 3.35 17,303
So the measure was successful at predicting future crashes - but when and how deep there
was no precise way to know. However, long-run mean reversion suggests that the longer the
bull run is and the more over-priced the measure is, the longer and deeper the decline will
probably be. Then one can use the measure as part of an econometric system to estimate
future scenarios.
Each time the spread exceeded the 4.23 cuto↵ (which was higher than 95% confidence) there
was a crash. The measure was way in the danger zone in late 1989 and the decline (the
21st crash) began on the first trading day of 1990 with the Nikkei stock average peaking
at 38,916. See Figure 1. It is too bad Yamaichi’s top management did not listen to Iishi
when I sent him up to explain our results in Japanese; there was much greater danger in
the market then they thought in 1989. By 1995 Yamaichi Securities was bankrupt and
ceased to exist.
The model also indicates that the valuation was still high as of May 29, 1990 at 4.88.
Not much later, the 22nd crash began. Interestingly, at the bottom of the 22nd crash on
5
Historical perspectives on BSEYD Lleo and Ziemba
October 1, 1990, the NSA was at 20,222, which was almost exactly the mean. Meanwhile,
the same calculation on May 29, 1990, for the S&P500 is shown in Figure 2. Indeed, it was
cheap, that is below the mean, since the September 1987 peak of 4.42. The May 29, 1990
value of 1.11 was, however, slightly above the mean level and the highest since the late fall
of 1987.
Figure 2: Bond and stock yield di↵erential model for the S&P500, 1980-1990, Source:
Ziemba and Schwartz, 1991
Value of S&P500 for various spread values
Date/level Spread, % S&P500
May 29, 1990 1.11 360.65
Mean 0.98 355.00
Upper limit 2.09 415.00
Lower limit -0.13 309.00
Japan has had weak stock and land markets for twenty years, since the beginning of 1990.
There are many factors for this that are political as well as economic. But the rising
interest rates for eight full months until August 1990, see Figure 3(a) is one of them. This
extreme tightening of an over-levered economy was too much. Cheap and easily available
money, which caused the big run-up in asset prices in the 1980s turned into expensive and
unavailable money in the 1990s. This has parallels to the 2007-2009 US situation where
easy available money, not necessarily cheap, turned into unavailable cheap money.
Despite the terrible earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011, many analysts con-
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Figure 3: Interest rates in Japan
sider the stock market finally a buy because of very low valuations. They are proved right
in 2013 with a large rally caused more by a lower yen than high earnings or low interest
rates. With very low interest rates that are close to zero, the bond-stock earnings yield
model is not in the danger zone. So the markets attractiveness is from its PE ratio relative
to other assets and markets. There are various ways that one can compute the upper and
lower limits but experience has shown that with the various approaches, all of which use
out of sample prior data, one usually has the same conclusion. In Figure 2, the limits are
simply the trailing mean plus or minus a standard deviation measure so the one sided limit
has 95% of the probability.4
4Using a di↵erent index rather than the S&P500 has the same conclusion but slightly di↵erent results.
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3 Relationship between the BSEYDmodel and the Fed model
The Bond-Stock Earnings Yield (BSEYD) relates the yield on stocks (measured by the
earnings yield) to the yield on nominal Treasury bonds.
BSEYD(t) = r(t)  ⇢(t) = r(t)  E(t)
P (t)
, (1)
where ⇢(t) is the earnings yield at time t and r(t) is the most liquid (10- or 30-year) Trea-
sury bond rate r(t).
Earnings expectations are incorporated in stock prices and discounted via
p˜(t) =
E(t)
r(t)
, t = 1, 2, . . . (2)
where E(t) denotes the earnings per share at time t and r(t) is the most liquid (10- or
30-year) Treasury bond rate.
Equity earnings per share  (t) is the expected earnings for a unit investment in the stock
market with equity shares, S(t), namely
 (t) =
E(t)
S(t)
. (3)
Then,
S(t) =
E(t)
 (t)
.
There is a direct relationship between the equity yield in Equation (3) and the long bond
rate in Equation (2) . The ratio of the current market value to the theoretical value is the
Fed model bond stock yield ratio BSYR(t)
S(t)
p˜(t)
=
E(t)/ (t)
E(t)/r(t)
=
r(t)
 (t)
= BSY R(t). (4)
Berge, Consigli and Ziemba (2008) used the MSCI index. The danger zone was entered in May 1987
and the correction occurred in October, four months later. During June, July and August investors kept
rebalancing their portfolios from the bond to the equity market (MSCI TRI + 13.87% over the quarter)
then the equity market fell 31.80% in the following quarter (September to November 1987) with the main
decline in October.
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The bond stock earnings yield di↵erential that we focus on in this paper is related to the
valuation measure and the equity yield via
S(t)
p˜(t)
  1 = BSEY D(t)
 (t)
(5)
BSEY D(t) = [BSY R(t)  1] (t). (6)
The di↵erential reflects the di↵erence between the current market value and its theoretical
value. A more theoretically sound motivation for the predictive ability of the BSEYD is
using the basic Gordon formula (see (Gordon 1959)), where E/P is the forward earnings
yield (which Schwartz and Ziemba (2000) show is the best predictor of at least individual
Japanese stock prices),
E/P - nominal yield = equity risk premium - real growth - inflation.
So the BSEYD can be used as a proxy for the unobservable right hand side economic
variables. (Lleo and Ziemba 2014a) proposes a slightly di↵erent derivation of the relation
between the BSEYD and the Gordon growth model.
In its most popular form, the Fed model states that in equilibrium, the one year forward
looking earnings yield of the S&P500 should equal the current yield on a 10-year Treasury
Note (Estrada, 2006; Weigand and Irons, 2007; Fauge`re and Van Erlach, 2009; Maio, 2013;
Fauge`re, 2013), that is
r(t)  E
f
t
P (t)
= 0, (7)
where Eft is the S&P 500 one year forward looking earnings. The Fed model is therefore
a special case of the BSEYD model when the bond and stock yields are equal, meaning
r(t) = E
f
t
P (t) . For given equity yield, the BSEYD can be used to identify zones of under and
over valuation and forecast possible forthcoming market adjustments.
Koivu, Pennanen and Ziemba (2005) study the Fed model using a dynamic vector equi-
librium correction model with data from 1980 to 2003 in the US, UK and Germany and
show that the Fed model had predictive power in forecasting equity prices, earnings and
bond yields. The model has been successful in predicting market turns, but in spite of its
empirical success and simplicity, the model has been criticized. First it does not consider
the role played by time varying risk premiums in the portfolio selection process while it
does consider a risk free government interest rate as the discount factor of future earnings.
The inflation illusion (the possible impact of inflation expectations on the stock market)
as suggested by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) is not taken into consideration. Secondly, the
model assumes the comparability of earning price ratios, a real quantity, with a nominal,
9
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bond induced, interest rate [Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Asness (2000, 2003), and
Ritter and Warr (2002) discuss these issues.] Consigli, MacLean, Zhao and Ziemba (2009)
propose a stochastic model of equity returns based on an extension of the model inclusive
of a risk premium in which market corrections are endogenously generated by the bond-
stock yield di↵erence. The model accommodates both cases of prolonged yield deviations
leading to a long series of small declines in the equity market and the case, peculiar of re-
cent speculative bubbles, of a series of corrections over limited time periods. The inclusion
of the yield di↵erential as a key driver of the market correction process is tested and the
model is validated with market data
Many of the critics focus on: 1) short term predicability that we know is weak as does
Giot and Petitjean (2008), 2) simply do not focus on the long run value of the measure,
or 3) dismiss it outright because of the real versus nominal versus real minor flaw as does
Montier (2011). Consigli, MacLean, Zhao and Ziemba (2009) use the model to estimate
the current fair value of the S&P500. Of course, market and fair value can diverge for
long periods. However, our concern is whether or not the model actually predicts stock
market crashes, stock market rallies and good times to be in and out of stock markets.
Berge, Consigli and Ziemba (2008) discuss the latter issue and found for five countries
(US, Germany, Canada, UK and Japan) that the strategy stay in the market when it is
not in the danger zone and move to cash otherwise provides about double the final wealth
with less variance and a higher Sharpe ratio than a buy and hold strategy. There is some
limited predictability of stock market increases but the evidence supports the good use of
the model to predict crashes. In this paper we study the past, including the recent period
2007-2009 for the US, China and Iceland, all of which had large crashes. Shiller (2006)
observes, as we have (see Table 34), that low PE periods seem to lead to higher future
stock prices and high PE periods to lower future prices. But the presumption is that PE
levels may not be enough to call the crashes. The argument in Ziemba (2003) or Ziemba
and Schwartz (1991) and here is that it is usually the interplay of interest rates measured
by the long bond with the PE ratios that gives the crash signal.
4 Moving Average and Signal Chart
In the following sections we use a moving average and a rolling horizon standard devia-
tion to establish the confidence levels. The h-day moving average at time t, µht , and the
corresponding rolling horizon standard deviation  ht given by
10
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Table 2: Evolution of the P/E Over Selected 20-Year Periods With High Annualized Re-
turns. Source: Bertocchi et al (2010)
Beginning Year Ending Year Annual Rate of Return Beginning P/E Ending P/E
1975 1994 9.6% 10.9 20.5
1977 1996 9.7% 11.5 25.9
1942 1961 9.9% 12.2 20.5
1983 2002 10.9% 7.3 25.9
1978 1997 11.9% 10.4 31.0
1981 2000 12.8% 8.8 41.7
1979 1998 12.9% 9.4 36.0
1982 2001 13.0% 8.5 32.1
1980 1999 14.0% 8.9 42.1
µht =
1
h
h 1X
i=0
xt i
 ht =
vuut 1
h  1
h 1X
i=0
(xt i   µht )2.
Rolling horizon means and standard deviations used to compute confidence levels for the
BSEYD provide data consistency as they are not overly sensitive to the starting date of
the bond yield or stock market data, or to the overall number of data points.
For our analysis of the US market in Section 9, we use a five year horizon, so h = 1260
as longer time horizons tend to generate a robust signal and eliminate false positives.
Five years of historical bond and stock data may be a di cult requirement outside of
major markets. For Iceland and China, we use a one year rolling horizon, but tighten
the confidence level in order to eliminate false positives. Similarly, in Section 10 we use a
one-year horizon to test statistically the predictive ability of the BSEYD on the US market
because it is short and can be used on most financial markets without requiring a long
data history, making international comparison easier.
The idea behind the BSEYD model is that a crash signal should occur whenever
BSEY D(t) > CL(t),
where CL(t) represents a one-tail confidence level. The level CL acts as a time-varying
threshold for the crash signal. So, a crash signal occurs whenever
SIGNAL(t) := BSEY D(t)  CL(t) > 0.
11
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Graphically, the threshold for the crash signal is now a horizontal line with value 0, dis-
cussed in section 5 and shown below in Figures 30, 31(b), 25, 36(a) and 36(b). These
graphs show a calculation of SIGNAL(t) based respectively on a standard one-tail 95%
confidence level and on an application of Cantelli’s inequality.
An examination of the BSEYD spread distributions reveals their non-normal nature (see
Figures 23, 27 and 37). As a result, standard confidence intervals which are based on a
Gaussian assumption may prove inaccurate. In this case, we use Cantelli’s inequality, a
one-sided version of Chebyshev’s inequality, to derive a ‘worst case’ confidence level (see,
for example, Problem 7.11.9 in (Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001)).
Cantelli’s inequality relates the probability that the distance between a random variable X
and its mean µ exceeds a number k > 0 of standard deviations   to this distance as
P [X   µ   k ]  1
1 + k2
or alternatively
P
"
X   µ    
r
1
↵
  1
#
 ↵,
where ↵ = 11+k2 . The parameter ↵ provides an upper bound for a one-tailed confidence
level on any distribution, regardless of how di↵erent it is from a Normal distribution.
We use Cantelli’s inequality with a one-tail confidence level to assess the relative strength
of a signal. Using the one-tail confidence level, we obtain the crash signal. We then find
the Cantelli probability ↵ giving us a similar signal date to the Gaussian approach. To
generate the same signal as a standard 95% confidence level, we need to select ↵ = 27% in
Cantelli’s inequality. Similarly, to generate the same signal as a standard 99% confidence
level, we need to select ↵ = 15.60%
For China, as discussed in section 8, we used a standard 99% confidence level to determine
the signal. Based on Cantelli’s inequality, we expect in the worst case to have a crash
signal 15.60% of the time. Retrospectively, Cantelli’s inequality is rather severe since it
places the threshold for a signal at a BSEYD spread of 3% or above, on 372 consecutive
trading days from June 9, 2005 to June 30, 2012 (i.e. 20.56% of the 1809 days for which
this measure was computed). By contrast, if we consider the distribution over the entire
period, we observe that the spread only exceeded 2.5% on 3 instances (i.e. 0.17% of the
1809 days for which this measure was computed). In summary, a standard 99% confidence
level would have been su cient to determine a clear crash signal.
For Iceland, as discussed in section 7, we use a 95% confidence level to determine the sig-
nal, Cantelli’s inequality suggests a worst case probability that 27% of observations could
12
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result in a signal. However, lowering the Cantelli probability ↵ from 27% to 20% (corre-
sponding roughly to a standard 97.7% confidence level) does not result in significant loss
of responsiveness of the signal, at least for Glitnir and Kaupthing (see Figures 25).
For the United States, as discussed in Sections 9 and 10, our analysis covers a standard
one-tail 95% normal distribution based confidence level and an application of Cantelli’s
inequality. The conclusions are similar in both cases.
5 The 2000-2003 crash in the S&P500
The S&P500 was 470.42 at the end of January 1995. It was about 750 in late 1996 at the
time of Alan Greenspan’s famous speech on irrational exuberance in the US stock market.
It peaked at 1527.46 on March 24, 2000, fell to 1356.56 on April 4th, and then came close
to this peak reaching 1520 on September 1st, the Friday before Labor Day. The bond-stock
crash model was in the danger zone virtually all of 1999 and it got deeper in the danger
zone as the year progressed as the S&P500 rose from 1229.23 at the end of December 1998
to 1460.25 at the end of December 1999. The PE ratio was flat, increasing only from 32.34
to 33.29 while long bond yields rose from 5.47 to 6.69. The S&P500 fell to 1085 on Sept
7th prior to September 11, 2001.
Table 3 and Figure 4(a) detail this from January 1995 to December 1999. The spread
reached three which was well in the 95% confidence danger band in April and rose to 3.69
in December 1999. The stage was set for a crash which did occur as shown in Figure
5a. Long term mean reversion suggests that the 1996-2000 S&P500 values were too high
relative to 1991-95 and a linear interpolation of the latter period gives a value close to that
in 2002. Meanwhile Hong Kong as shown in Figure 4(b), was also in the danger zone.
The model for Japan was hard to interpret because there were high PE ratios but interest
rates were close to zero so one had a close to 0-0 situation so the model did not apply to
Japan in 1999. The model was not in the danger zone with return di↵erences close to zero;
see Figure 4(c).
We witnessed a dramatic fall in the S&P500 from its peak of 1527 in March 2000 to its
September 17, 2000 low of 1085. Further declines occurred in 2001 and 2002, see Figure
4(c). The lowest close to May 2003 was 768.63 on October 10, 2002.5 This decline was
similar to previous crashes. There were other signals
History shows that a period of shrinking breadth is usually followed by a sharp
decline in stock values of the small group of leaders. Then broader market takes
5Of course, there was a lower close of 666 in March 2009, just before the big rally into 2014.
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Table 3: Bond and stock yield di↵erential model for the S&P500, 1995-1999. Source: Berge
and Ziemba (2001)
a b c=1/a b-c a b c=1/a b-c
year month
S&P500 
Index PER
30-yr gov't 
bond
return on 
stocks
crash 
signal year month
S&P500 
Index PER
30-yr gov't 
bond
return on 
stocks
crash 
signal
1995 Jan 470.42 17.10 8.02 5.85 2.17 1997 Jul 954.29 23.67 6.78 4.22 2.56
Feb 487.39 17.75 7.81 5.63 2.18 Aug 899.47 22.53 6.71 4.44 2.27
Mar 500.71 16.42 7.68 6.09 1.59 Sep 947.28 23.29 6.70 4.29 2.41
Apr 514.71 16.73 7.48 5.98 1.50 Oct 914.62 22.67 6.46 4.41 2.05
May 533.40 16.39 7.29 6.10 1.19 Nov 955.40 23.45 6.27 4.26 2.01
Jun 544.75 16.68 6.66 6.00 0.66 Dec 970.43 23.88 6.15 4.19 1.96
Jul 562.06 17.23 6.90 5.80 1.10 1998 Jan 980.28 24.05 6.01 4.16 1.85
Aug 561.88 16.20 7.00 6.17 0.83 Feb 1049.34 25.09 6.00 3.99 2.01
Sep 584.41 16.88 6.74 5.92 0.82 Mar 1101.75 27.71 6.11 3.61 2.50
Oct 581.50 16.92 6.55 5.91 0.64 Apr 1111.75 27.56 6.03 3.63 2.40
Nov 605.37 17.29 6.36 5.78 0.58 May 1090.82 27.62 6.10 3.62 2.48
Dec 615.93 17.47 6.25 5.72 0.53 Jun 1133.84 28.65 5.89 3.49 2.40
1996 Jan 636.02 18.09 6.18 5.53 0.65 Jul 1120.67 28.46 5.83 3.51 2.32
Feb 640.43 18.86 6.46 5.30 1.16 Aug 97.28 27.42 5.74 3.65 2.09
Mar 645.50 19.09 6.82 5.24 1.58 Sep 1017.01 26.10 5.47 3.83 1.64
Apr 654.17 19.15 7.07 5.22 1.85 Oct 1098.67 27.41 5.42 3.65 1.77
May 669.12 19.62 7.21 5.10 2.11 Nov 1163.63 31.15 5.54 3.21 2.33
Jun 670.63 19.52 7.30 5.12 2.18 Dec 1229.23 32.34 5.47 3.09 2.38
Jul 639.96 18.80 7.23 5.32 1.91 1999 Jan 1279.64 32.64 5.49 3.06 2.43
Aug 651.99 19.08 7.17 5.24 1.93 Feb 1238.33 32.91 5.66 3.04 2.62
Sep 687.31 19.65 7.26 5.09 2.17 Mar 1286.37 34.11 5.87 2.93 2.94
Oct 705.27 20.08 6.95 4.98 1.97 Apr 1335.18 35.82 5.82 2.79 3.03
Nov 757.02 20.92 6.79 4.78 2.01 May 1301.84 34.60 6.08 2.89 3.19
Dec 740.74 20.86 6.73 4.79 1.94 Jun 1372.71 35.77 6.36 2.80 3.56
1997 Jan 786.16 21.46 6.95 4.66 2.29 Jul 1328.72 35.58 6.34 2.81 3.53
Feb 790.82 20.51 6.85 4.88 1.97 Aug 1320.41 36.00 6.35 2.78 3.57
Mar 757.12 20.45 7.11 4.89 2.22 Sep 1282.70 30.92 6.50 3.23 3.27
Apr 801.34 20.69 7.23 4.83 2.40 Oct 1362.92 31.61 6.66 3.16 3.50
May 848.28 21.25 7.08 4.71 2.37 Nov 1388.91 32.24 6.48 3.10 3.38
Jun 885.14 22.09 6.93 4.53 2.40 Dec 1469.25 33.29 6.69 3.00 3.69
a more modest tumble. Paul Bagnell in late November 1999 in the Globe and
Mail.
Figure 6 shows the rise in Canada on the Toronto stock exchange (TSE300) the during 1999
and 2000 and the subsequent fall in 2001 and 2000. During 1999, the TSE300 gained 31%
but the gain was only 3% without three very high PE, high cap stocks showing extreme
concentration in the market. The largest gainer in market value, Nortel Networks, peaked
at US$120 and was about US$1.70 at the end of 2002 and lower in 2010 after a reverse
stock split. This is shown in Figure 7.
The concentration of stock market gains into very few stocks with momentum and size
being the key variables predicting performance was increasing before 1997 in Europe and
North America. Table 4 for 1998 shows that the largest cap stocks had the highest return
in North American and Europe but small cap stocks outperformed in Asia and Japan. The
situation was similar from 1995 to 1999 with 1998 and 1999 the most exaggerated.
The influential book Irrational Exuberance by Yale behavioral finance economist Robert
Shiller (2000) hit the market in April 2000. It was a monumental success in market timing,
with an especially bearish view that is consistent with our Figure 4(a) and Table 1. Shiller’s
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) document very high PE ratios in relation to earnings in 2000 with
most of the rise in the 1995-2000 period similar to our Table 3 for the S&P500. His 100-
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(a) Bond and stock yield di↵erential model for the
S&P500, 1990-1999.
(b) Hang Seng (PI) and BSEYD for 5Y government
bonds 1995 - 1999 (BSEYD mean and SD are calcu-
lated for October 1994 - December 1999)
(c) Nikkei stock average and BSEYD for 10Y govern-
ment bonds (BSEYD mean and SD are calculated for
October 1994 - August 1998),
Figure 4: Bond and stock yield di↵erential model for the S&P500, the Hang Seng and the
Nikkei Stock Averages. Source: Berge and Ziemba (2001)]
plus year graphs are very convincing that in 1996-2000 the stock market was over priced
relative to historical norms.
Shiller had been predicting a crash since 1996 as reported in Campbell and Shiller (1998).
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(a) 1991-2002 (b) Around Sept 11, 2001
Figure 5: The S&P500
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Figure 6: The Toronto Stock Exchange, February 1998 to January 2003
Table 4: MSCI Indices grouped into quintiles by 12/31/97 P/E ratio, 12/31/98
World All North America Europe - All Latin America Asia ex Japan Japan
Total Return Total Return Total Return Total Return Total Return Total Return
Quintile P/E Equity MktCap P/E Equity MktCap P/E Equity MktCap P/E Equity MktCap P/E Equity MktCap P/E Equity MktCap
1 Highest 57 13% 48% 48 20% 63% 55 25% 53% 31 -38% -31% 36 -6% 7% 134 8% -5%
2 25 13% 45% 26 16% 43% 24 24% 25% 19 -32% -21% 18 10% 10% 39 16% 16%
3 18 9% 30% 20 7% 24% 19 16% 32% 14 -38% -28% 13 15% 11% 29 15% 12%
4 14 -1% 17% 17 1% 30% 15 -0.4% 35% 9 -34% -37% 8 -2% 13% 22 28% 24%
5 lowest 8 3% 17% 13 -1% 11% 10 -3% 13% 5 -27% -25% 5 19% 35% 14 38% 32%
His view has not changed and he remains defiantly bearish (as in Campbell and Shiller
(2001) which is an update of the 1998 paper) and in later interviews and indeed throughout
the 2000s to 2011. His case was helped by three largely unpredictable bad scenarios. Those
are the September 11, 2001 attack on the US, the June/July 2002 crises of accounting
16
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Figure 7: The narrow base of the Toronto Stock Exchange 1999 rally. Source: Globe and
Mail
17
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(a) Real S&P composite price index, monthly (upper
series) and real S&P composite earnings (lower series).
(b) Inflation corrected PER, moving average over pre-
ceding ten years of real S&P earnings.
Figure 8: Stock prices, earnings and the price earnings ratio, January 1871-January 2000.
Source: Shiller (2000)
confidence in the US and the 2003 US/British war with Iraq. One can argue that the
second bad scenario is a direct consequence of the 1996-99 bubble period as does the
Economist (2002) and in Warren Bu↵et and Peter Drucker interviews. The latter two
sages saw this a long time ago. Also the third bad scenario was a consequence of the
first.
Some conclusions are:
1. We should be able to use measures like the bond-stock return di↵erence and research
like Shiller’s graphs to create better scenarios. According to Chopra and Ziemba
(1993), the mean is by far the very most important aspect of return distributions
and that is clear here. Figure 9 for the S&P500 in 2000-2002 reminds us of that.
2. The extent of such danger measures also suggest that the entire distribution from
which scenarios are drawn should be shifted left towards lower and more volatile
returns. We know that volatility generally, but not always, increases as markets
decline. Koivu, Pennanan and Ziemba (2005) show one way to create such better
scenarios.
3. The evidence is high that stocks outperform bonds, T-bills and most other financial
assets in the long run; see Figures 10(a) and 10(b) and Table 6. Stocks generally
outperform in times of inflation and bonds outperform in times of deflation; see e.g.
Smith (1924). Why do stocks generally outperform bonds? “A major reason is that
18
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Figure 9: S&P500 index and US government bonds. Source: Schroder Investment Man-
agement Ltd, 2002
businesses retain earnings, with these going onto create more earnings and dividends
too.” (from the review of Smith (1924) by J. M. Keynes in 1925 quoted in Bu↵ett
(2001). In times of growth, firms borrow at fixed cost with the expectation of earning
positive economic profit so in the long term, equities as a reflection of this positive
income creation should grow at the rate of productivity.
4. There are occasional long periods when stocks underperform alternative asset classes.
Figure 11 from Siegel (2008) shows this for the nominal and real 30 stock Dow Jones
averages from 1885 to 2006 in 2006 dollars. One sees a quite violent but upward
trending path. The DJIA in nominal terms provides a similar but still bumpy path.
The e↵ect of dividends tends to smooth this path and provide a substantial part of
the total returns.
Figure 9 shows the 2000-2002 period for the S&P500 and US government bonds.
When bonds outperform stocks, as in this latter period, they are usually negatively
correlated with stocks as well; see Figure 12 which has rolling correlations. Between
1982 and 1999 the return of equities over bonds was more than 10% per year in EU
countries. The question is whether we are moving back to a period where the two
asset classes move against each other or whether this will just prove to be a temporary
phenomenon.
Moreover, the historical evidence since 1802 for the US and 1700 for the UK indicates
that the longer the period the more likely is this dominance to occur. Indeed, despite
long periods with losses in the indices, the total returns can be positive.
Figure 11 shows the real returns without dividends for the 30-stock Dow Jones Av-
erage from 1885-2006 in 2006 dollars.
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Thank you for subscribing to www.FinancingLife.org.  (c) Rick Van Ness, 2013. 
3 
The worst case is for a market crash to happen early in your 
retirement requiring depressed assets to be consumed before they 
have a chance to recover. The problem is that nobody can foresee 
these events. Nobody. 
The cost for increasing safety is lower returns. Look at the 
dramatically different compound growths of stock, bond, and gold 
investments over two centuries based upon the work of Dr. Jeremy 
Siegel (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania). 
 
Source: Jeremy Siegel, used with permission. 
Stocks also historically provided highest long-term real returns—
which is after inflation and what you really care about. John C. 
Bogle (founder of Vanguard) says that Siegel’s   chart   shows   that  
for two centuries, stocks have generated an average return of 7% in 
real, inflation-adjusted dollars. 
Bonds, over these two centuries, have generated average real 
returns of 3.5%—half the 7% real return generated by stocks. In 
other words, stocks have delivered more than twice as much 
growth in purchasing power as bonds.3 It   isn’t   unusual   to   have  
extended periods where bonds generate negative real returns, 
something that stocks just  haven’t  been  prone  to  do. 
The difference between 7%  and  3.5%  doesn’t  sound  like  much,  but  
it makes a huge difference when compounded over many years. 
That’s   compelling,   and   leads   John   Bogle   to   write,   “Although 
stocks are extremely volatile in the short run, the long-term 
investor cannot afford not to take those risks.”4 
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Portfolio Perspectives
The chart shown below is a powerful illustration of some really 
long-term investing. It uses the research of Dr. Jeremy Siegel, a 
professor at Wharton, who has studied real returns — after inflation 
— of U.S. indices going back to 1802. 
Across wars, civil wars, incredible social and economic change 
and 47 recessions, depressions and financial panics, $1 invested 
in 1802 in American stocks (according to Siegel), was worth 
$706,199 in December of 2012.
Total Real Return Indexes
Jan. 1, 1802 – Dec. 31, 2012
Source: Siegel, Jeremy, Future for Investors (2005), With Updates to 2012. Data 
is from Jan. 1, 1802 – Dec. 31, 2012. Past performance is no guarantee of future 
results. This is for illustrative purposes only and not indicative of any investment. 
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the expenses associated with the management of an actual portfolio.
Stock investing involves risks, including increased volatility (up and down 
movement in the value of your assets) and loss of principal.  Investors with time 
LSVM^SRWSJPIWWXLER½ZI]IEVWWLSYPHGSRWMHIVQMRMQM^MRKSVEZSMHMRKMRZIWXMRK
in common stocks.  
Bonds are subject to market and interest rate risk.  Bond values will decline as 
interest rates rise, issuer’s creditworthiness declines, and are subject to availability 
and changes in price.
 The price of gold may be affected by global gold supply and demand, currency 
exchange rates and interest rates. Investors should be aware that there is no 
assurance that gold will maintain its long-term value in terms of purchasing 
power in the future.
T Bills are backed by the US government and are subject to interest rate and 
MR¾EXMSRVMWO8&MPPZEPYIW[MPPHIGPMRIEWMRXIVIWXVEXIWVMWI8LIZEPYISJXLI97
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While no one has a life span — or an investing time span — of 
more than 200 years, the lesson we can all learn is that it doesn’t 
really matter what the markets do in the course of a year or two. 
If we keep a long-term perspective, and stay invested through 
the ups and the downs, we have the potential to earn the overall 
returns of the markets. Some years will be positive and some will 
be negative, but long-term investors don’t need to “play” the stock 
market to reach their most important goals.
1Christopher R. Blake, Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, University of Chicago, 1993, The Performance of Bond Mutual Funds
Michael C. Jensen, Harvard Business School, 1967, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964
James L. Davis, Dimensional Fund Advisors, 2001, Mutual Fund Performance and Manager Style, Finanical Analysts Journal 
Laurent Barras, Olivier Scaillet & Russ Wermers, Robert H. Smith School, 2010, False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas
Standard & Poor’s Indices Versus Active, 2010, Standard & Poor’s Indices Versus Active Funds (SPIVA) Scorecard, Year-End 2010
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, University of Chicago & Dartmouth College, 2010, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross Section of Mutual Fund Returns
© 2013 LWI Financial Inc. All rights reserved. LWI Financial Inc. (“Loring Ward”) is an investment adviser registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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Figure 10: Returns from US stocks and other assets, 1802-2012. Source: Siegel(2014)
Siegel (2014) has shown that over all thirty year periods from 1900 to 2006 US equities
out erform d bonds a d in 10- and 20-year periods, stocks have outperformed bonds
most, but not all, times. Table 5 shows the impact of dividends.
Table 5: Sum ary statistics for dividends per share, earnings per share and stock returns
for the US economy, 1871 through December 2006. Source: Siegel, 2008
P1: a/b P2: c/d QC: e/f T1: g
c04 JWBT199-Ziemba October 14, 2009 14:43 Printer: Courier Westford
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F IGURE 4.7 Annualized Performance from 1900 to 2008
Source: Dimson, Marsh, Staunton (2009).
path and provide a substantial part of the total eturns. Indeed, despite
long periods with losses in the indices, the total returns can be positive.
Siegel (2008) has shown that from 1900 to 2006 in every 30-year period,
stocks have outperformed bonds; and in 10- and 20-year periods stocks
have outperformed bonds most, but not all, of the times. Table 4.2 shows
the dividend yields from 87 –2006.
Table 4.3 sh ws th total return of eq iti s in the 73-year perio fr m
December 31, 1925 to D cember 31, 1998 and portfolio allocations based
on risk aversion in Table 4.4. See Kallberg and Ziemba (1983) for the theory
behind these calculations f the portfolios based on risk aversion. For those
with long horizons, a high amount of equities is suggested. But what is the
long run? We will return to this issue repeatedly in this book.
We know that, most of the time, stocks move with earnings. As earnings
move, so will stock prices. Of course, the average PE ratio varies with time
TABLE 4.2 Summary Statistics for Dividends per Share, Earnings per Share, and
Stock Returns for the US Economy, 1871 through December 2006
Real GDP Real per Share Real per Share Div dend Pa ut
Growth Earnings Growth Dividend Growth Yield∗ Ratio∗
1871–2006 3.57% 1.88% 1.32% 4.58% 58.17%
1871–1945 3.97% 0.66% 0.74% 5.29% 66.78%
1946–2006 3.09% 3.40% 2.03% 3.53% 51.38%
∗ Denotes median.
Source: Siegel (2008).
There have been four periods in the US markets where equities had essentially zero
gains in nominal terms, not counting dividends, 1899 to 1919, 1929 to 1954, 1964
to 1981 and 1997 to 2009. Conversely, there have only been four periods were there
were nominal gains not counting dividends: 1919-1929, 1954-1964, 1981-1997 and
2009-2014.
Over 30-year horizons, it is optimal (with a mean-variance model) to be more than
100% in stocks and short bonds based on the past. Siegel uses various risk tolerance
measures such as ultra-conservative and risk taking. These are easy to devise using
the Kallberg-Ziemba (1983) results by just assigning Arrow-Pratt risk aversion values
as I have done in the second column of Siegel’s Table 7. Over 100% means more than
100% stocks or a levered long position which would be short bonds or cash.
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Figure 11: DJIA, February 1885 to December 2006, in 2006 dollars. Source: Siegel, 2008.
5. Stochastic programming models handle extreme event scenarios in a natural way.
There is little chance that one can correctly predict events like September 11, 2001’s
attack. However, scenarios that represent the e↵ect that such events could occur in
terms of their impact on market returns can be included. If such events have never
occurred before, scenarios can be devised from similar events in other markets and
their possible outcomes.
Table 6: Equities have generated superior returns in the long run, December 1925-December
1998. Source: Ibbotson, 1999 in Swensen (2000)
Asset Class Multiple
Inflation 9 times
Treasury bills 15 times
Treasury bonds 44 times
Corporate bonds 61 times
Large-capitalization stocks 2,351 times
Small-capitalization stocks 5,117 times
Figure 13 shows the late 2002 values for the crash indicator using the Fed model. That
model uses 10-year bond yields and computes the ratio of the bond and stock yields in
terms of a percent over- or under-valued. This measure is a special case of the BSEYD
model. This graph from Ned Davis research indicates that very under-valued markets since
1980 have historically had high returns. When the measure is above 15% then mean S&P
returns average a loss of 6.7%. From 5 to 15% had mean gains of 4.9% and below -5%
had mean gains of 31.7%. In late 2002/early 2003, the market was at one of its steepest
discount to fair value. See Figure 14 for our calculations which mirror those of Davis. The
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Table 7: Portfolio allocation: percentage of portfolio recommended in stocks based on all
historical data (RA= risk aversion index). Source: Siegel (2008) using theory from Kallberg
and Ziemba (1983)
Risk Holding Period
Tolerance RA 1 year 5 years 10 years 30 years
Ultraconservative 10 9.0% 22.0% 39.3% 71.4%
Conservative 6 25.0% 38.7% 59.6% 89.5%
Moderate 4 50.0% 61.6% 88.0% 116.2%
Risk Taking 2 75.0% 78.5% 110.1% 139.1%
Figure 12: The correlation between US equity and government bond returns. Source:
Schroder Investment Management Ltd, 2002
length and depth of the 2000-2003 decline is seen in the jagged parts of Figures 13 and 14.
One sees the initial danger zone for the measure in 1999 but then the market returned to
the danger zone in 2001 and 2002 because stock prices fell but earnings fell even more. This
was a period where consensus future earnings forecasts were invariably far too optimistic.
The S&P500 index fell from 1460.25 at the end of December 1999 to 885.76 on October
31, 2002 down 37%.
Another valuation measure due to Warren Bu↵ett is the market value of all publicly traded
stocks relative to the GNP. Bu↵ett suggests if the measure is 70 or 80% it’s a buy and
over 200% like in 1999 it’s a sell. The measure was 133% in late 2001 and was lower in
early 2003 since the stock market has fell more than the GNP. This measure, like Figure
13, signals a recovery in stock prices.6 This first appeared in Ziemba (2003), the AIMR
6The crash and evaluation measures discussed here are based on economic evaluations combined with
sentiment. Another interesting approach is through chaos models, a survey of this area and presentation of
results is in the 2002 papers of Corcos et al and Sornette and Zhou.
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Figure 13: Race to the bottom, Source: Ned Davis Research
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Figure 14: The FED model, 1980-2003. Source: Koivu, Pennanen and Ziemba (2003)
monograph. The Bu↵ett call was right. So was the long bond-stock call.
However, 41% of the stocks in the S&P500 did not fall or actually rose during this period
and an additional 19% declined by 10% or less annualized. These were small cap stocks
with market values of $10 billion or less; see Figures 15 and 16. The fall in the S&P500 was
mainly in three areas: information technology, telecommunications and large cap stocks.
Information technology stocks in the S&P500 fell 64% and telecom stocks fell 60% from
January 1 to October 31, 2002. The largest cap stocks (with market caps of $50 billion
plus) lost 37%. But most other stocks either lost only a little or actually gained. Materials
fell 10% but consumer discretionary gained 4.5%, consumer staples gained 21%, energy
gained 12%, financial services gained 19%, health care gained 29%, industrials gained 7%
and utilities gained 2%. Equally weighted, the S&P500 index lost only 3%. These values
include dividends. The stocks that gained were the very small cap stocks with market caps
below $10 billion. Some 138 companies with market caps between $5-10 billion gained
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4% on average and 157 companies with market caps below $5 billion gained on average
23%.
2
impact on its performance. If it used an unweighted average (in which each company has the same weight regardless of
size) or tracked the performance of the median company, it would have fallen by very little during the same 34 months.
Bear market performers
A look at individual companies rather than the aggregate reveals the surprising fact that the value of the shares of 41
percent of the S&P 500 companies actually rose. The shares of an additional 19 percent of the companies in the index
declined in value by less than 10 percent on an annualized basis.
Bubble sectors burst
Previous Next
Figure 15: Distribution of annualized total returns of S&P500 stocks from January 1 2000
to October 31, 2002 in percentages by categories of returns. Source: Koller and Williams
(2003)
6 Using the BSEYD model for long run investing
Berge and Ziemba (2003) and Berge, Consigli and Ziemba (2008) study this measure from
1970 and 1975 to 2000 in five major markets, namely the US, Germany, Canada, the UK
and Japan.
They compare four strategies for each of the time periods based on the length of the sample
from previous data (either 5 or 10 years) to determine the distribution type (historical or
assumed normally distributed), the fractile for entry (70, 75, 80 or 85%) and the fractile
for exit (90 or 95%), the confidence limits.
The 5 year data intervals were used for the 1980 to 2005 calculations and 10 years for the
1975 to 2005. The results vary slightly by strategy but the basic conclusions are the same.
These results are summarized in Table 8 for strategies 1 and 5 that have 5 and 10 years
prior historical data, and 80% and 85% entry percentiles and 90% and 95% exit percentiles.
All the results are in Berge, Consigli and Ziemba (2008) which also lists all the declines of
10%+ during this 20 year period.
The initial wealth start at $100 (US), C 100 (Germany), C$100 (Canada), £100 (UK), and
100U(Japan) and the terminal values are the gross performance using the strategy signals..
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Figure 16: Wealth relatives of S&P500 stocks, January 2000 to October 2002
The mean excess return is the average monthly excess return of the strategy over the stock
market. In each country, the final wealth of the strategies exceeds (except for Canada) buy
and hold for the stock market with some months in cash and a higher Sharpe ratio.
7 The Iceland 2008 crash
In July 2006 Ziemba was in Iceland speaking at an Operations Research conference and
became interested in the economic situation there. Let’s first look at the long bond (10-
year) versus earnings yield di↵erentials for the US, the UK, Japan, France and Germany
as of July 12, 2006 as shown in Table 9.
The danger zone requires a long bond rate well past +2.5% and close to +3% above the
stock earnings yield. Table 9 indicates that despite weak global markets in mid 2006, none
of these countries were in the danger zone. It would have taken a large increase in long
bond rates, which seemed unlikely then, and, of course, did not materialize; and or a large
decrease in the earnings yield to reach the danger zone, which would imply a large chance
of a fall of 10% plus within one year.
In Iceland, the 15 stocks in the index have weights of 26.5% to 1%, see Table 10. But
the main point is that the three largest banks Kaupthing (26.5%), Lansbanki (13.0%) and
Ghitnir (12.3%) were more than half the market capitalization and Actavis Banki had
9.9%, and FL Banki another 6.7%. So the banks are well towards two thirds of the index
value. And index funds that track the market actually slightly over weight these banks to
yield higher returns.
Figure 17, shows the dramatic rise of the stock market particularly since 2004. It also
shows how quickly these drops occur. However, the notable sharp sell-o↵s, have to a large
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Table 8: Evaluation of the performance of the strategies 1 and 5 versus the market index
in the US, Germany, Canada, UK and Japan from 1975 and 1980 to 2005
Overall Performance of the Strategies and the Stock Market
Number of Months Mean Log Standard Sharpe Mean Excess Terminal
Strategy in the Index Return Deviation Ratio Return Value
US 1 319 (85,75%) 0.01194 0.03933 0.17814 0.00162 8,480.41
US Index (1975 2005) 372 (100%) 0.01032 0.04347 0.12401 4,649.75
US 5 273 (87,5%) 0.01254 0.03887 0.19773 0.00224 5,009.00
US Index (1980 2005) 312 (100%) 0.0103 0.04389 0.12405 2,490.17
G 1 302 (81.18%) 0.00881 0.0515 0.09157 0.00068 2,652.80
German Index (1975 2005) 372 (100%) 0.00813 0.05864 0.06886 2,061.27
G 5 279 (89.42%) 0.00963 0.05836 0.09405 0.00123 2,014.62
German Index (1980 2005) 312 (100%) 0.0084 0.06201 0.0687 1,373.26
C1 295 (79.3%) 0.00954 0.04243 0.08053 -0.0002 3,479.37
Canada Index (1975 2005) 372 (100%) 0.00974 0.04925 0.07337 3,743.49
C 5 273 (87.5%) 0.00937 0.04336 0.07839 0.00094 1,859.80
Canada Index (1980 2005) 312 (100%) 0.00843 0.04941 0.04977 1,387.23
UK 1 329 (88.44%) 0.01426 0.0502 0.14825 0.00102 20,163.11
UK Index (1975 2005) 372 (100%) 0.01324 0.05598 0.1147 13,787.40
UK 5 297 (95.19%) 0.01204 0.0442 0.12277 0.00101 4,275.28
UK Index (1980 2005) 312 (100%) 0.01103 0.04814 0.09179 3,121.47
J 1 222 (89.52%) 0.00612 0.05049 0.08427 0.00305 455.72
Japan Index (5/85 12/05) 248 (100%) 0.00307 0.05778 0.02085 213.88
J 5 172 (91.49%) 0.0012 0.0505 -0.00157 0.00168 125.35
Japan Index (5/90 12/05) 188 (100%) -0.00048 0.05745 -0.03062 91.39
extent been blips and there is a question whether these investments can continue to produce
similar returns, and if not, whether that will prompt investors to seek other markets.
Index funds such as Gitnir’s (#6) track the market and essentially duplicate it as shown in
Figure 17. These values are net of real inflation (2-4%) and show a high rate of return since
1995. There were losses during 2000 and 2001 but very large gains in 2002-2005.
The stock market increased in 2006 then declined during the 20% currency depreciation
that started in February. The real issue is whether these high prices are sustainable, and
how much they depend on continuing high returns from the foreign assets of the banks and
companies. The PE ratio of the index in April 2006 was 16.3 (with a 44% real increase in
stock prices since April 2005 when the PE ratio was 17.3). At the same time, the current
account deficit increased from 9.3% of GDP to 16.5%. According to the CBI, there is a
future PE ratio of 11.1 when financial companies are included and 14.2 without.
In the book Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) with data up to July 2006 and a postscript to
March 2007, the Iceland stock-bond crash measure was as in Table 11:
Figure 18 shows the long term nominal bond yields and Figure 19 shows the term structure
of interest rates as of June 16, 2006, a short rate of 13% and a long rate (5 year) of 9.4%.
Using the future PE ratio of all 15 stocks (financial and non-financial) gives the bond-stock
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measure at +0.39% and out of the danger zone; see Table 11.
Table 11 provides two bond stock measure calculations. The index measure is out of the
danger zone. However the non-financial sector was in the danger zones but its weight was
not enough to pull down the whole market according to the script of the bond-stock crash
measure.
The low PE plus the lower long term interest rates still at about 9% but substantially
below the 14.25% projected to 16% short rates made the market look risky. So did the
parabolic increase of the index in real terms from 1997-2006 shown in Figure 17 . But
there was no signal yet for a crash. Lleo and Ziemba (2012) have studied this crash as well
as the one in 2007 in China, and 2007-09 in the US which is discussed in the following two
sections of this paper.
Doing the calculation with the past earnings PE multiple on the non financials and a
blended short/long interest rate of 11% puts the non-financial stock index measure at
4.87% (which is in the danger zone). So the conclusion was cloudy. Ziemba and Ziemba
(2007) wrote: a crash may be avoided but the market looks very risky.
Who owns these equities?
Table 12 indicates that the banks own 41.5%, and the pension funds 29.1% so they who
have been the major benefactors of the 2002-2006 (Feb rise) and would be the major losers
(unless they sell or hedge) in a crash so Ziemba and Ziemba said in 2007. And indeed they
were.
7.1 Prospects for the Future as discussed in Ziemba and Ziemba (2007)
The second half of 2006 and 2007 will be a crucial period in Iceland. The rising inflation
and overheated economy are likely to lead naturally to higher interest rates. These in
turn will lead to other stresses on the economy. It will be essential that the investments of
Icelandic companies and banks continue to perform well; should some of these deals fail, the
impact on investor confidence could be damaging to the currency, stock and bond markets.
However the strength of the financial system, the hedging and operating environment, has
significant strengths. The evidence points to a weak housing market, high interest rates, a
risky stock market and an economy that, despite the troubles, will possibly limp through
for better times in 2008.
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7.2 Postscript, March 2007 from Ziemba and Ziemba (2007)
Several developments have transpired in the second half of 2006. First, the pace of inflation
growth is dropping. According to the Kaupthing Bank, Inflation has fallen from a yearly
rate of 7.3% in November 2006, to 7.0 in December and a projected 6.7% in January .
Second, economic growth is slowing to 0.8% in Q3 2006 for an yearly rate of about 3%
in 2006. The rate of increase of the property index is dropping dramatically. There are
no losses yet though they loom on the horizon. The property index was up 4.8% in 2006.
Third, the trade deficit remains high and is increasing because imports are growing while
exports are flat. Fourth, consumer confidence remains very high. Fifth, short term interest
rates, which were 13% in July 2006 are 14.25% following an unexpected 25 basic point rise
on December 21, 2006. Long rates remain in the 9% area. Some, like the Kaupthing Bank,
think this is the last interest rate hike but that rates will remain high. Others, like Danske
bank, think the short rates might go to 16% and that a severe growth slump and likely a
recession are very likely.
So the country is risky for investment. Sensing this riskiness the S&P rating agency lowered
the foreign currency sovereign credit ratings of long term debt from AA- to A+ and for
short term debt from A-1+ to A-1. Finally the stock market continues to rise and is just
now slightly above the February 2006 peak when it fell about 20% during the financial
crisis at that time as described above.
The 15 stock index was up 15.8% in 2006 and dividends 19.0% with a 3.8% increase in
December 2006. In January 2007 the index has risen an additional 8.3% to the 22nd,
Glitnir forecasts a 21% rise in 2007. With the long term (5 year bond) interest rate still
at 9% and the price earnings ratio such that the earnings to price yield is in the 10% area,
the bond stock measure is still not in the danger zone.
But the least slip in earnings would put it in the danger zone. The slowing of housing price
increases which look like they will turn to decreases soon and the possible recession and at
least a major slowdown suggest that these earnings will drop. That coupled with the very
high short term interest rates which are likely to stay high or even climb suggest that the
stock market is very risky.
In the discussion in Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) with data to July 2006 but a postscript to
March 2007 was guarded pessimism - we thought that it would crash but the bond-stock
yield measure was not quite there yet.
Figure 20 shows that in the fall of 2007, the long bond interest rates did get above 10%
and that with an increase in the PE ratio respectively to 10.91 for Glitnir as of October
10, 11.09 for Kaupthing as of October 11 and 9.94 for Lansbanki as of October 17 show
that the signal did predict the massive crash. The market peaked at 8174.28 on July 18,
2007 starting in 2002 at 1180.75. Then it fell to 5803.55 by the end of December 2007. The
28
Historical perspectives on BSEYD Lleo and Ziemba
complete collapse came in 2008 with the market falling about 90% to end 2008 at 581.76.
The bottom of the market was at 491.58 on February 2, 2010 and as of November 30, 2010
has risen to 579.15 and currently was 864.93 on December 31, 2013. Table 13 summarizes
the year to year story and Figure 21 shows the index values from 1993 to 2014
Figure 22 shows the price-earnings ratios for the three top banks.
Iceland is a small country with only 300,000 people. From the 2002 to 2007, the economy
and asset prices rose dramatically with much leveraging of investments, especially by the
banks. This led to high interest rates of about 10% long term and 16% short term. Even-
tually, it all collapsed in the wake of the 2007-2009 worldwide financial crisis. And the
decline was a massive crash of -95% in the equity index and a currency collapse.
Figure 17, shows the dramatic rise of the stock market particularly since 2004. It also
shows how quickly these drops occur. However, the notable sharp sell-o↵s, have to a large
extent been blips and there was a question whether these investments could continue to
produce similar returns, and if not, whether that would prompt investors to seek other
markets.
Figure 23 shows the BSEYD spreads for the three top banks and Figure 25 shows the
bond-stock earnings yield crash measure by month. Like China, the BSEYD distributions
of these three largest banks are not normally distributed and have very fat left tails.
Finally, the question of whether or not the bond-stock earnings yield model predicted the
crash is studied in Figures 25ace which use 95% one sided confidence intervals using moving
averages. These graphs show that the crash was predicted. For Kaupthing, the danger zone
was penetrated on September 28, 2007, two months after the July 18 peak and less than
a month before the November 11 crash. Finally, for Glitnir, the signal was much earlier
on October 10, 2006, some thirteen months before the crash. Finally, for Lansbanki, the
danger signal was on February 13, 2007. Figure 23bdf show the BSEYD using Cantelli’s
inequality to account for the non-normality of the BSEYD measure. We focus on the
largest banks because they led the market into the collapse. The smallest stocks were in
the danger zone in 2006 as discussed in Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) but not the large banks
then.
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Table 9: Long-bond (10 yr) versus earning yield di↵erentials for major countries, July 12,
2006. Source: Ziemba and Ziemba (2007)
S&P500 FTSE200 Nikkei225 CAC40 DAX30
Index 1259 5861 15249 4942 5638
A) PE ratio 16.86 16.61 36.26 13.82 13.33
B) Stock Return (1/A) 5.93% 6.02% 2.76% 7.24% 7.50%
C) Bond Return (10 yr) 5.10% 4.67% 1.94% 4.10% 4.09%
D) Crash Signal (C-B) -0.83 -1.35 -0.82 -3.14 -3.41
Table 10: Stock market index. Source: Glitnir (2006b)
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high interest rates may begin to have a negative
impact on growth and financial assets (see Figure
9).  The CBI is well managed and will likely drop
rates in 2007 but it is easy to overshoot here.  WTZ
points to the example of Japan where the BOJ
raised rates in 1988-89.  They continued to do so
even after the stock market began to fall in
January 1990 and proceeded to raise rates till
August 1990, a full 8 months more.  This was a
major cause of many bankruptcies and the 15-
year slump in Japan’s economic and
financial markets. However in an
environment of global tightening,
especially with the Fed unlikely to
stop tightening until September
2006 at the earliest, the CBI may be
unable to get out of step for fear of a
decreasing interest rate differential,
even if that results in an overshoot.
Given high and rising inflation in
Iceland, the CBI will have domestic
reasons to continue to raise interest
rates. 
Many have spoken about a possi-
ble housing bubble. A government
policy of subsidizing interest rates at
5 per cent for personal housing is one
contributing factor encouraging this
overheating. However, commercial
and industry held property does not
benefit from this subsidy. However,
the policy of many companies of sell-
ing property and leasing it back to
access further credit many have con-
tributed to this boom.   It is hard not
to foresee trouble in the housing sec-
tor especially with steady increases in
nominal prices since 2002 and yearly
gains in the 30-40 per cent range in
2004 and 2005 and a 20 per cent rise
the first half of 2006.  Since there is an increased
supply of land, much construction, a softening
market with prices higher than construction
costs, coupled with the higher interest rates, less
credit available for housing loans, declining con-
sumer confidence, the prediction of Glitnir
(2006) that nominal prices might decline 5-10 per
cent in 2007 might even be optimistic. A key
question is whether they will fall softly or there
will be a hard landing.
Financial (in)stability?
In their report, which responds to many of the
vulnerability analyses of Iceland, Mishkin and
Herbertsson (2006) drawing from the economic
literature, argue that there none of three routes
to financial instability are present in the
Icelandic situation of today. These drivers of
instability are: 
1. financial liberalization with weak pruden-
tial regulation and supervision;
2. severe fiscal imbalances; and 
3. imprudent monetary policy.
They conclude that the economy has adjusted
to financial liberalization and there is prudent
regulation and effective supervision.  There gov-
ernment debt has decreased to low levels and the
pension system is fully funded.  Monetary policy
has kept core inflation (excluding housing) on
Table 7: Stock market index.  Source:  Glitnir (2006b)
Weights Real rates of return
Company Fund Index Fund Index
1 Kaupthing Banki hf. 27.2% 26.5% 2005 56.5% 54.5%
2 Landsbanki Islands hf. 13.1% 13.0% 2004 49.1% 47.2%
3 Glitnir Banki hf. 12.5% 12.3% 2003 42.7% 40.7%
4 Straumur Buróarás Fjárfes 8.9% 8.9% 2002 20.7% 19.2%
5 Actavis Banki hf. 10.1% 9.9% 2001 -16.4% -16.6%
6 FL Banki hf. 6.3% 6.2% 2000 -16.7% -17.2%
7 Bakkavör Group hf. 4.0% 4.1% 1999 36.7% 36.4%
8 Avion Group hf. 3.7% 3.7% 1998 6.3% 3.4%
9 Mosaic Fashions hf. 2.7% 2.6% 1997 9.0% 10.2%
10 Ossur hf. 2.2% 2.2% 1996 44.1% 57.3%
11 Tryggingami∂tö∂in hf. 2.1% 2.0% 1995 33.4% 31.1%
12 Dagsbrún hf. 1.5% 1.5%
13 Alfresca hf. 1.2% 1.2%
14 Fjárfestingafélagi∂ Atorka 1.0% 1.0%
15 Grandi hf. 1.0% 1.0%
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Figure 10:  The 15 stocks in the Iceland equity
index and their growth in real terms from 
1997-2006.  Source:  Glitnir (2006b)
16%
15%
14%
13%
12%
11%
10%
9%
8%
7%
6%
5%
4%
Jan. 03 Jul. 03 Jan. 04 Jul. 04 Jan. 05 Jul. 05 Jan. 06 Jul. 06 Jan. 07 Jul. 07
Figure 9:  short interest rates 2003-2007. Source:  Glitnir (2006a)
Table 6:  Long-bond (10 yr) versus earning yield 
differentials for major countries, July 12, 2006
S&P500 FTSE200 Nikkei225 CAC40 DAX30
index 1259 5861 15249 4942 5638
A) PE ratio 16.86 16.61 36.26 13.82 13.33
B) Stock Return (1/A) 5.93% 6.02% 2.76% 7.24% 7.50%
C) Bond Return (10 yr) 5.10% 4.67% 1.94% 4.10% 4.09%
Crash Signal (C-B) -0. -1.35 -0.82 -3.14 -3.41
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Figure 17: The Iceland equity index and its growth in real terms from 1997-2006. Source:
Glitnir (2006b).
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Figure 18: Long term nominal Treasury bond yields, June 16, 2006
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Figure 19: Term structure of nominal interest rates, June 16, 2006.
Table 11: Bond-stock measure calculations in Iceland
index 16 nonfin 15 in index
A) PE ratio 11.1
B) Stock Return (1/A) 6.13% 9.01%
C) Bond Return (5 yr) 11.00% 9.4%
D) Crash Signal (C-B) 4.87% 0.39%
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Table 12: Main owners of securities in February 2006. Source: CBI (2006, p 32). Numbers
are in indicated in millions of Icelandic kro´na (M.kr)
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Index funds such as Gitnir’s (#6) track
the market and essentially duplicate it as
shown in Figure 10.  Such index funds
have slightly overweighted the large
banks, thus leading to higher returns.
These values are net of real inflation (2-4
per cent) and show a high rate of return
since 1995.  There were losses during
2000 and 2001 but very large gains in
2002-2005.
The stock market increased in 2006
then declined during the 20 per cent cur-
rency depreciation that started in
February. The real issue is whether these
high prices are sustainable, and how
much they depend on continuing high
returns from the foreign assets of the banks and
companies. The PE ratio of the index in April
2006 was 16.3 (with a 44 per cent real increase
since April 2005 when the PE ratio was 17.3).  At
the same time, the current account deficit
increased from 9.3 per cent of GDP to 16.5 per
cent. According to the CBI, there is a future PE
ratio of 11.1 when financial companies are
included and 14.2 without.
Figure 11 shows the term structure of interest
rates in as of June 16, 2006, a short rate of 13 per
cent and a long rate (5 year) of 9.4 per cent.  Using
the future PE ratio of all 15 stocks (financial and
non-financial) gives the bond-stock measure at
+0.39 per cent and out of the danger zone; see
Table 8. 
Table 8 provides two bond stock measure cal-
culations.  The measure is 0-5 per cent so while it
is below ideal conditions is not in the danger
zone but could well be.  
Doing the calculation with the past earnings
PE multiple on the non financials and a blended
short/long interest rate of 11 per cent puts the
measure at 4.87 per cent (which is in the danger
zone).  So the conclusion is cloudy.  A crash may
be avoided but the market looks very risky.
Who owns these equities?
Table 9 indicates that the banks own 41.5 per
cent, and the pension funds 29.1 per cent so they
who have been the major benefactors of
the 2002-2006 (Feb rise) would be the
major losers (unless they sell or hedge) in
a crash.
Prospects for the future
The second half of 2006 and 2007 will be
a crucial period in Iceland. The rising
inflation and overheated economy are
likely to lead naturally to higher interest
rates.  These in turn will lead to other
stresses on the economy. It will be essen-
tial that the investments of Icelandic
companies and banks continue to per-
form well; should some of these deals
fail, the impact on investor confidence
could be damaging to the currency, stock and
bond markets.  However the strength of the
financial system, the hedging and operating
environment, has significant strengths.   The evi-
dence points to a weak housing market, high
interest rates, a risky stock market and an econo-
my that, despite the troubles, will limp through
for better times in 2008.
The following references present additional
information and analyses.
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Table 9:  Main owners of securities in February 2006
M.kr Equities % HFF bonds %
Households 285,690 11.7% 3,042 0.8%
Housing Financing Fund 0.0% 18,275 4.9%
Commercial banks and saving banks 242,051 9.9% 153,492 41.5.%
Investment banks 70,921 2.9% 10,927 3.0.%
Securities companies 18,646 0.8% 1,093 0.3%
Investment funds 39,362 1.6% 32,663 8.8%
Pension funds 217,292 8.9% 107,541 29.1%
Insurance companies 58,094 2.4% 5,951 1.6.%
Businesses 864,701 35.4% 2,890 0.8%
Non-residents 523,776 21.4% .
Others 7,663 0.3% 1,545 0.4%
Custody accounts 113,701 4.7% 32,327 8.7%
Total 2,441,897 100.0% 369,746 100.0.%
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Figur 20: Iceland Treasury note (long bond) maturing May 17, 2013
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Figure 21: Iceland stock index price level
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Figure 22: Price-earnings ratios for the three top Icelandic banks
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Table 13: Highlights for the Iceland stock index ICEXI-OMZ 1998-2014 with start value
= 1000 on December 31, 1997
Date Index Value Comment
Feb 11, 1998 977.58
Dec 31, 1998 1046.58
Dec 31, 1999 1511.86 Gain of 44.5% in 1999
Dec 31, 2000 1303.31 }
Dec 31, 2001 1180.75 } Weak market during US stock market weak period
Dec 31, 2002 1436.22 }
Dec 31, 2003 2064.05 Gain of 43.7% in 2003
Dec 31, 2004 3173.91 Gain of 53.8% in 2004
Dec 31, 2005 5107.49 Gain of 60.9% in 2005
Feb 2,2006 6287.29 Local high of market
Aug 2, 2006 4854.95 Local low of market
Dec 31, 2006 5857.50 Gain of 14.7% in 2006
July 18, 2007 8174.28 Global highest historical market close
Aug 16, 2007 6931.69 Market falls to local lows on day of US stock market
turmoil when long-short funds had heavy losses
Oct 11, 2007 7796.36 Local market peak then complete market collapse
Dec 31, 2007 5803.35 Market down just slightly (-0.9%) in 2007
but 29% below the July 18, 2007 peak
Dec 31, 2008 581.76 Complete depression including a collapse of over 90%
from the peak
Dec 31, 2009 496.48 Further fall in 2009
Feb 2, 2010 491.58 Global historical bottom of market
Nov 30, 2010 579.17 The market rallied back to make the yearly return nearly positive
Dec 31, 2010 569.19 Gain of 15.8% since global historical bottom
but the index was still 93.0% below its historical high
Jan 31, 2011 624.97 Gain of 9.8% in January 2011
Jun 30, 2011 604.95 Gain of 23.0% since the global historical bottom
but the index was still 92.5% below its historical high
December 31, 2011 567.77 Gain of 15% since the global historical bottom
but the index was still 93% below its historical high
June 30, 2012 677.75 Gain of 38% since the global historical bottom
but the index was still 92% below its historical high
December 31, 2012 678.15 Gain of 19.4% in 2012 and of 38% since the global historical bottom
but the index was still 92% below its historical high
December 31, 2013 864.93 Gain of 27.5% in 2013 and of 89% since the global historical bottom
but the index was still 92% below its historical high
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Figure 23: BSYEM Spread Distributions, Iceland
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Crash Indicator (Cantelli's Inequality, 20%): GLB 
First signal occurs on October 17, 2006. The market reaches its peak on July, 20 2007.  
Spread for GLB Mean Confidence Interval Stock Price 
signal peak 
(b) Glitnir, MACI
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Crash Indicator (95% confidence): KAUP 
First signal occurs around September 28, 2007. The market reaches its peak on July 18, 
2007 and a crash occurred on November 11, 2007.  
Spread for KAUP Mean 95% Confidence Interval Stock Price 
signal peak crash 
(c) Kaupthing, MA
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Crash Indicator (Cantelli's Inequality, 20%): KAUP 
First signal occurs on October 2, 2007. The market reaches its peak on July 18, 2007 and a 
crash occurred on November 11, 2007.  
Spread for KAUP Mean Confidence Interval Stock Price 
signal peak crash 
(d) Kaupthing, MACI
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Crash Indicator (95% confidence): LAIS 
First signal occurs around February 13, 2007. The market reaches its peak on October 17, 
2007.  
Spread for LAIS Mean 95% Confidence Interval Stock Price 
signal peak 
(e) Lansbanki, MA
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Crash Indicator (Cantelli's Inequality, 20%): LAIS 
Faint signal throughout the first half of 2007. The market reaches its peak on October 17, 
2007.  
Spread for LAIS Mean Confidence Interval Stock Price 
peak 
(f) Lansbanki, MACI
Figure 24: Crash Indicators, Iceland
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Signal Chart (95% confidence): LAIS!
First crash signal occurs around February 13, 2007. The market reaches its peak on 
October 17, 2007.  
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Signal Chart (Indicator using Cantelli's Inequality, 20%): LAIS!
Faint crash signal throughout the first half of 2007. The market reaches its peak on October 
17, 2007.  
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Figure 25: Crash Signals, Iceland
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8 The crash of China’s Shanghai stock index
Figure 26 shows the rise of the Shanghai stock index from January 4, 2000 to February 25,
2014. The market bottomed at 1011 on July 11, 2005. It then rose six-fold to peak at 6092
on October 16, 2007. Then there was a crash of 11.98% to from 5180 to 4560 on January
21 and 22 followed by another 7.19% fall from 4762 to 4419 on January 28, 2008.
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Figure 26: The Shanghai stock exchange composite index, January 2000 to February 25,
2014
Did the BSEYD model predict this crash? First, Figure 27 shows that the BSEYD measure
is not normally distributed with fat right and especially left tails. The biggest declines are
larger than the biggest increases.
Figures 28 and 29 show that the model did in fact predict the crash. It is a typical
application of the model. The signal goes into the danger zone, then the market continues
higher but within four to twelve months there is a crash of 10%+ from the initial signal.
In this case, the decline is much higher than 10%. Figure 28 uses a 95% confidence one
sided moving average interval using prior data out of sample. The danger signal occurs
on November 12, 2006, some eleven months before the stock market peak on October 16,
2007. Figure 29 uses a 99% one sided confidence interval and gives the first danger signal
on June 29, 2007, with the index at 3821. The market reached its peak on October 16,
2007.
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Figure 27: Spread distribution of the BSEYD measure on the Shanghai Stock Exchange
Composite
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Figure 28: BSEYD crash indicator (95% one sided moving average confidence): Shanghai
Stock Exchange Composite
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BSEYD Chart (Indicator at 95% confidence): Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite  
First signal occurs on December 12, 2006. The market reaches its peak on October 16, 2007 and ultimate low on November 4, 2008.  
Spread (10Y yield - E/P) Mean spread Confidence interval (95% 1-tail) SSE Composite Index 
Crash signal on 
December 12, 2006 
Index level: 2218.95 
Peak on October 16, 2007 
Index level: 6092.06 
Ultimate low on November 4, 2008 
Index level: 1706.70 
39
Historical perspectives on BSEYD Lleo and Ziemba
Table 14: Highlights on the Shanghai Stock Index, 2005-2013
Date Index Value Comment
Dec 31, 2004 1266.50
May 23, 2005 1070.84 The index was down 15.4% year-to-date
July 11, 2005 1011.50 Market bottom
Dec 31, 2005 1161.06 The index was down 8.3% in 2005
Dec 12, 2006 2218.95 95% confidence BSEYD crash signal occurs
Dec 25, 2006 2435.76 99% confidence BSEYD crash signal occurs
Dec 31, 2006 2675.47 The index was up 130.4% in 2006
May 29, 2007 4334.92 Local high of the market. The market was up 62% year-to-date
July 5, 2007 3615.87 Local low of the market. The market was still up 35.1% year-to-date
Oct 16, 2007 6092.06 Highest historical market close. The market was up 127.7% year-to-date
Nov 28, 2007 4803.39 Local low of the market. The market was still up 79.5%year-to-date
Dec 31, 2007 5261.56 Index was up 96.7% in 2007, but down 13.6% from its peak in October
Jan 14, 2008 5497.90 Local high of the market
Jan 18, 2008 5180.51 The index closes the week at 5180.51,
which is 5.8% lower than than its local high on Jan 14
Jan 21, 2008 4914.43 The index experiences a one-day drop of 5.1% from 5180.51 to 4914.43
Jan 22, 2008 4559.75 The index experiences declines by 7.2% on this day,
opening at 4914.43 to close at 4559.75
Jan 25, 2008 4761.69 The index recovers slightly to close the week at 4761.69
Jan 28, 2008 4419.29 The index drops by 7.2% from 4761.69 to 4419.29
Apr 18, 2008 3094.67 Local low of the market
May 5, 2008 3761.01 Local high of the market
Nov 4, 2008 1706.70 Global market minimum. The market was down by 72% peak to trough
and 23.09% and 29.93% from the December 12 and 25 danger signal levels
Dec 31, 2008 1820.81 The market was down 65.4% in 2008
Aug 3, 2009 3471.44 Local high of the market. The market was up 103.4% from the trough
Aug 31, 2009 2667.75 Local low of the market
Nov 23, 2009 3338.66 Local high of the market
Dec 31, 2009 3277.14 The market was up 80% in 2009
Jul 5, 20100 2363.95 Local low of the market
Dec 31, 2010 2808.08 The market was down 14.3% in 2009
Jun 30, 2011 2762.08 The market was down about 1% year-to-date
August 31, 2011 2567.34 The market was down about 8.6% year-to-date
September 30, 2011 2359.22 The market was down about 16% year-to-date
December 31, 2011 2199.42 The market was down 6.8% in 2011
December 31, 2012 2269.13 The market was up 3.2% in 2012
December 31, 2013 2115.98 The market was down 6.7% in 2013
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Figure 29: BSEYD crash indicator (99% one-sided moving average confidence): Shanghai
Stock Exchange Composite
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BSEYD Chart (Indicator at 99% confidence): Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
First signal occurs December 25, 2006. The market reaches its peak on October 16, 2007 and ultimate low on November 4, 2008.  
Spread (10Y yield - E/P) Mean spread Confidence interval (99% 1-tail) SSE Composite Index 
Crash signal on 
December 25, 2006 
Index level: 2435.76 
Peak on October 16, 2007 
Index level: 6092.06 
Ultimate low on November 4, 2008 
Index level: 1706.70 
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Figure 30: BSEYD danger signals for the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite, Signals at
95% and 99% confidence
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BSEYD Chart: Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
First&signal&occurs&around&December&25,&2006.&The&market&reaches&its&peak&on&October&16,&2007.  
Spread (10Y yield - E/P) Mean spread Confidence interval (based on Cantelli's Inequality) SSE Composite Index 
Crash signal on December 25, 2006 
Index level: 2435.76 
Peak on October 16, 2007 
Index level: 6092.06 
(a) First signal occurs on December 25, 2006. The market reaches its peak on
October 16, 2007.
-10% 
-9% 
-8% 
-7% 
-6% 
-5% 
-4% 
-3% 
-2% 
-1% 
0% 
1% 
06/2006 06/2007 06/2008 06/2009 06/2010 06/2011 06/2012 06/2013 
Signal occurs on December 25, 2006 
(based on Cantelli's inequality, α = 15%) 
Signal Threshold 
Crash signal on 
December 25, 2006 
Index level: 2435.76 
(b) Signal occurs on December 25, 2006 (based on Cantelli’s inequality, ↵ =
15%)
Figure 31: BSEYD Cantelli danger signals for the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite
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9 The US 2007-2009 crash
In this section we investigate whether or not the bond-stock measure did predict the US
2007-2009 crash, specifically the September 2008 to March 2009 period. Table 9 shows the
BSEYD at various periods. In 2006 the weak economy led the Fed to dramatically reduce
short term interest rates which tended to drop the long term rates that we use in the BSEYD
calculations. Ex post it is clear that this stock market crash had a lot of components such as
the first decline in US housing prices n more than thirty years, a subprime market collapsing
because home buyers could not cover their mortgages, lots of suspect AAA rated packages
of these mortgages and then a credit squeeze with much counterparty risk with firms
unwilling to lend money to others including supposedly sound financial institutions and
the collapse of many large and previously sound financial institutions such as Bear Stearns,
AIG, Freddy Mac, Fannie May and the killer for the market, Lehman Brothers.
There are numerous books concerning this period plus many articles and columns, even
I have several in Wilmott. Starting in June 2007, I designed strategies and traded for an
o↵shore BVI based hedge fund for a group headed by a top trader. He had investments
in Bear Stearns and in June 2007 asked for his money back. That took three months and
gave him a strong signal of danger. As an astute trader, he hedged and studied carefully
the market situation through technical indicators that he has developed. I remember his
words to me starting in the summer of 2007 “this is the big one” ...“eventually the market
will go to 666 on the S&P500”. In the fall of 2007 the S&P500 was about 1550, see
Table 32. So this was a rather bold call but a private one and it turned out to be very
accurate. Rachel Ziemba was working in New York for Nouriel Roubini’s company, Roubini
Global Economics and he was predicting very boldly a serious financial meltdown starting
in 2006 when the housing market was beginning its decline; see Figure 33 which gives the
Case Shiller Home Price Index as of July 24, 2008. We see a sharp decline from 2005 to
2008. As of April 2011, he and other bears such as Yale Professor Robert Shiller were still
pessimistic about the economy, real estate and financial markets. Dropping real estate has
several depressive e↵ects such as homeowners can no longer use house price gains to fund
consumption, foreclosures, etc. The March 2009 low was 660 and the subsequent rally has
doubled the S&P500 to the 1330 area at the beginning of April 2011 then to the 1840 area
in February 2014. There is lots of discussion regarding whether or not this rally is low
interest rate related to the Fed quantitative easing, or only game in town since real estate,
bonds and cash look unattractive. This is a case when the BSEYD signaled the rise in
stock prices.
Lets go back to the BSEYD and consider Table 15 which was published in the Maudlin
weekly newsletter on 2008, and discuss whether or not it called the September 2008 to
March 2009 crash.
First though, lets look at the measure across the world on July 12, 2006 in Table 9.
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Figure 32: The S&P500, January 1, 2006 to february 25, 2014
Figure 33: Case Shiller Index as of July 29, 2008.
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We see that none of these major markets were in the danger zone then. Figures 34ab
show the S&P500 PE ratios (Shiller’s calculation method) and the ten-year Treasury bond
yield.
WTZIMI 74 
S&P500 PE Ratio 
(a) S&P500 price earnings ratios
WTZIMI 75 
10 year Treasury yield 
(b) Treasury bond yield
Figure 34: S&P500 and ten-year Treasury bond yields. Source: Robert Shiller data.
Table 15: Earnings revisions for 2008 and 2009, analysts estimates of earnings in dollars.
Source: Maudlin,2008
Date Earnings Date Earnings
. . . and estimates for 2009
March 2007 92.00 March 20, 2008 81.52
December 2007 84.00 April 9, 2008 72.60
February 2008 71.20 June 25, 2008 70.13
June 1, 2008 68.93 September 10, 2008 48.52
July 25, 2008 72.00 August 29, 2008 64.44
September 30, 2008 60.00 February 1, 2009 42.00
October 15, 2008 54.82 February 20, 2009 32.41
February 20, 2009 26.23 April 10, 2009 28.51
April 10, 2009 14.88
Table 15 has the S&P500 2008 estimated earnings and 2009 forecasted earnings. On July
25, 2008, the S&P500 earnings for 2008 were estimated to be 72.00 with the S&P500 at
1257.76 which gives a PE ratio of 17.47 which is not high enough to signal the September
2008 to March 2009 crash. But by February 20, 2009, the 2008 earnings were estimated
to be 26.23. With the S&P500 at 770.05 on that day the PE ratio was 29.36 which gives
a BSEYD value of 3.81%, with the ten year Treasury bond yielding 2.78%. This is in the
danger zone but a rather late call.
Shepherd (2008) has the S&P500 PE ratio at 723! So what did I conclude here? Well let’s
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go with the BSEYD model which had a crash call on June 14, 2007 and no such call after
that going into 2014.
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Figure 35: Crash Indicators, show June 14, 2007 signal
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Figure 37: Spread distribution of the BSEYD measure on the S&P500.
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Table 16: Highlights of the S&P500, January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2013
Date Index Value Comment
December 31, 2005 1248.29
August 31, 2006 1303.82 Gain of 4.4% year-to-date
December 31, 2006 1418.30 Gain of 13.6% in 2006
February 26, 2007 1437.50 Local high of market
March 1, 2007 1374.12 Local low of market
June 7, 2007 1480.72 Bear Stearns suspends redemptions from one of its hedge funds
June 14, 2007 1522.97 BSEYD crash signal occurs
July 13, 2007 1552.50 Local high of market
July 31, 2007 1455.27 Bear Stearns liquidates two hedge funds
August 16, 2007 1411.27 Local low of market
October 9, 2007 1565.15 Market peak. Gain of 10.4% year-to-date
December 31, 2007 1468.35 Gain of 3.5% in 2007
March 17, 2008 1276.60 Local low of market
September 15, 2008 1192.70 Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy protection
September 30, 2008 1166.36 Market down by 20.6% year-to-date
October 10, 2008 899.22 Local low of market
October 31, 2008 968.75 Market down by 16.9% in October
December 31, 2008 903.25 Market down by 38.5% in 2008
March 9, 2009 683.38 Lowest intraday: 666.79.
March 9, 2009 676.53 Market trough. The market was down by 56.8% peak to trough
July 28, 2009 979.62 Date Shepherd claimed that the S&P500 had a 723 PE ratio
based on reported (real earnings) to the SEC on 10Q forms
December 31, 2009 1115.10 Market was down by 23.5% in 2009, but up by 64.8% since trough
April 23, 2010 1217.28 Local high
July 2, 2010 1022.58 Local low
December 31, 2010 1257.64 Gain of 12.8% in 2010, and of 23%
since the local low of July 2, 2010
May 10, 2011 1357.16 Local high. Gain of 7.91% year-to-date and of 32.72%
since the local low of July 2, 2010
August 31, 2011 1218.89 Loss of 3.1% year-to-date and of 10.2%
since the local high of May 10, 2010
October 3, 2011 1099.23 Local trough. Loss of 12.6% year-to-date and of 19%
since the local high of May 10, 2010
December 31, 2011 1257.60 The S&P500 ends 2011 flat. Loss of 7.4%
since the local high of May 10, 2010
December 31, 2012 1426.19 Gain of 13.4% in 2012
December 31, 2013 1848.36 Gain of 29.6% in 2013
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10 How accurate is the BSEYD as crash prediction model?
Lleo and Ziemba (2014b) test statistically the predictive ability of the BSEYD model on a
fifty-one year period starting January 1, 1962 and ending December 31, 2012 (12,846 daily
data). The methodology is based on a standard Likelihood Ratio test conducted on a ‘hit
sequence’ derived from the time series of signal. This approach is akin to the run tests used
to determine whether a coin is fair. The methodology is complemented by a Monte Carlo
study for small sample bias and by an analysis of the robustness of the measure. In this
section, we highlight some of the key results and refer the interested reader to the paper
for a detailed description of the methodology and a full discussion of the results.
Table 17 shows that between January 1, 1962 and December 31, 2012 the S&P 500 Index
experienced eighteen crashes, defined as a decline of at least 10% form the previous peak in
less than one year. The three largest crashes were respectively a 52% decline from peak to
trough in 2007-2008, a 37% decline in 2000-2001 and a 36% decline in 1968-1970. Overall,
seven crashes exceeded 20% and 13 exceeded 15%.
What is the track record of the BSEYD model? Table 18 shows the BSEYD model based
on a standard confidence interval went into the danger zone on 39 distinct instances. The
prediction proved correct on 28 instances, giving a 72% accuracy. The number of predic-
tions is higher than the number of actual crashes because several distinct crash signals
may precede the same crash. This was the case for example in 1969, when the BSEYD
model produced four distinct signals on June 6, 1967, May 31, 1968, November 18, 1968
and May 25, 1969. The locals peak was reached on November 29, 1968. By June 20, 1969
the market had declined 10% within a year. The trough was eventually reached on May
26, 1970. This case is illustrated in Figure 38.
The observations for the BSEYD model based on Cantelli’s inequality are similar: the
model had 26 correct prediction out of 37 signals, a 70% accuracy.
Table 19 shows the results of the statistical test. The maximum likelihood estimate of
the signal pˆ in column 2 equals the historical accuracy of the models displayed in Ta-
ble 18. The likelihood ratio ⇤ in Column 3 is the ratio of the likelihood under the null
hypothesis that the BSEYD predictions are purely random, to the likelihood using the
estimated probability pˆ. The estimated test statistics, equal to  2 ln⇤, is asymptotically
 2-distributed with 1 degree of freedom. The p-value is the probability of obtaining a test
statistic higher than the one actually observed, assuming that the null hypothesis is true.
The degree of significance and the p-value indicated in the table are both based on the
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and Ziemba (2014b)
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Signal
Model
(1)
Total number
of signals
(2)
Number of correct
predictions
(3)
Proportion of correct
predictions (%)
(4)
Standard 39 28 71.79%
Cantelli 37 26 70.27%
Table 18: Proportion of Correct and Incorrect Predictions for Each Signal Model
Signal
Model
ML
Estimate
pˆ
L(pˆ) Likelihood
ratio ⇤
Test statistics
 2 ln⇤
p-value
Standard 71.79% 8.3989E-11 0.0217 7.6648** 0.56%
Cantelli 70.27% 1.6640E-10 0.0437 6.2597* 1.24%
* significant at the 95% level.
** significant at the 99% level.
Table 19: Maximum Likelihood Estimate and Likelihood Ratio Test
 2-distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The critical values at the 95%, 99% and 99%
level are respectively 3.8415, 6.6349 and 7.8794. Observe that the BSEYD measure based
on a standard confidence interval is significant at a 99% confidence level and the BSEYD
model based on Cantelli’s inequality is not far from the 99% mark. The null hypothesis
that the BSEYD predictions are purely random can be rejected: the BSEYD has an ability
to predict crashes over a one to two year horizon.
In addition to testing 8 choices of parameters for the BSEYD model, Lleo and Ziemba
(2014b) also tested the predictive ability of the logarithm of the BSEYD, the P/E ratio and
the logarithm of the P/E ratio. They found that historically the original BSEYD model
and its logarithmic version have shown a higher predictive ability than the P/E ratio.
Among the models tested, the logarithm of the P/E ratio showed the least consistency and
robustness.
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